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Abstract
We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for
the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This ¯nding should
help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining liter-
ature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality o®ered (at an increasing
price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon {
even in the limit as search frictions disappear.
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1 Introduction
It is a ubiquitous observation in our society that not only the best professionals can
make a living. There are plenty of mediocre lawyers, dentists and economists(!) who
are clearly outclassed by their peers but still ¯nd employment. Of course, there are
a number of straightforward explanations of why this should be the case. First, it is
likely that the demand for the services of these professionals is heterogenous: some
people are willing (and able) to pay more for better service, so if price discrimination
is not possible we must have quality diversity. A second argument relates to the
scarcity of high quality in the market. If a lower quality is instantaneously available,
while for the high quality one must queue, again there is room for lemons to enter
the market. A third argument is based on asymmetric information: if at the time of
contracting the quality is not observable by the customer, it actually may be the high
quality services that are driven out of the market.
While all the above arguments are convincing in their own right, we contend that
\quality dispersion" is a natural phenomenon in a decentralized market even if the
consumers are identical, the market is frictionless, and the consumers can tell the
quality of service before they purchase it.
We show our result in the context of a search/matching market in its steady state.
The literature on the analysis of such markets was begun by Diamond (1971), and has
evolved a great deal since. There have developed two main strands: search theory em-
phasizes the endogenous nature of the e®ort put into search activity, (over)simplifying
the exact nature of negotiation between a seller and a buyer { generally, by using the
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Nash bargaining solution {; matching-and-bargaining theory does the opposite, it
(over)simpli¯es search behavior { by assuming that it is governed by an exogenous
matching process { while it concerns itself more with the details of bargaining. We
start out in the spirit of the latter approach, but { rather reassuringly { end up with
a model that supports the reduced form approach of search theory.
The original argument against using the Nash bargaining solution in a non-
cooperative model of market interaction (mainly due to Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1985), Gale (1986) and Wolinsky (1987)) was simply based on the desire for a fully
non-cooperative treatment. A more devastating blow was the discovery of the \Out-
side Option Principle" (by Ken Binmore, Avner Shaked and John Sutton1), which
has established that the outside options should only have a direct e®ect on the out-
come of bargaining if they exceed the equilibrium payo® in the absence of an option.
It was Bester (1988) who incorporated the \full-°edged" non-cooperative bargaining
model into a matching market. Thus, in Bester's world when a buyer and a seller are
matched, they engage in alternating-o®er bargaining, where the buyer { but only the
buyer { has the option of breaking up the negotiations, following his rejection of any
o®er by the seller.
While in the original set-up of Diamond (1971) { where the sellers post prices and
the buyers visit the stores { this seems to be the appropriate model, in the context of
pairwise matching and bargaining of, say, professionals and their clients, it is not. It
1See Binmore (1985), Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989), Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Sutton
(1986).
3
is not, because it lacks symmetry. There is no reason whatsoever to rule out that a
lawyer refuses to work with a client who does not accept to pay the fee she demands.
Consequently, we need to incorporate into the bargaining model the option that both
players can leave the negotiating table. There are two obvious ways this can be done.
The ¯rst one is to allow only the responder to opt out in every period. While, by the
alternating structure of the bargaining procedure, this would ensure that both players
enjoy the option of quitting, one of them would be forced to su®er some (delay) cost
before being able to do so. This does not seem quite reasonable. Thus, we opt for
the alternative speci¯cation, where both players can leave following the rejection of
an o®er.2
As we argue it in detail in Section 3, the above modeling choice leads us to
a non-cooperative solution, which coincides with the (generalized) Nash bargaining
solution.3 Thus, we arrive at the paradoxical(?) conclusion that taking the strategic
approach \all the way", brings us back to the cooperative solution. (A ¯tting way
to culminate the Nash Program { the quest for a non-cooperative foundation of the
Nash bargaining solution.)
In addition to the conceptual breakthrough discussed above, we also arrive at
2Actually, the issue is not this simple. The crucial question is whether is it feasible that the pro-
poser can leave the negotiation following the rejection of his o®er without listening to the responder's
counter-o®er (c.f. Shaked 1994). If (and only if) the answer is yes, our set-up is the appropriate
model.
3It has been shown (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)) that the limit of the Ru-
binstein solution as the players become increasingly patient is the Nash solution. Our equivalence
result does not depend on taking any limit.
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practical predictions about the market equilibrium, in the presence of a (potentially)
disperse distribution of quality.4 Our main ¯ndings are two-fold. First, { and contrary
to Bester (1988) { we establish that the equilibrium price distribution is such that
the mark-up of the seller is always increasing with the quality of the service sold.
This is in clear accordance with the stylized fact that in general the pro¯t margin
is higher for higher valued goods/services. Second, we show that while it is true
that as search frictions diminish the average provision of quality increases { just as
predicted by Bester (1988) { , in the limit as these frictions disappear the equilibrium
does not converge to the degenerate case, where only the highest quality sellers can
stay in the market { as predicted by Bester (1988) {, rather we are left with a
very signi¯cant proportion of mediocre sellers in business. That is, we support our
contention mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction that quality dispersion is
an \innate" characteristic of decentralized markets.
The rest of this article continues as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the details of
our model. In Section 3, we develop our bargaining solution. Section 4 contains the
analysis of the market equilibrium and its dependence on the level of search frictions.
Section 5 concludes.
4Surprisingly { to the best of our knowledge { no search model using the Nash solution has
analyzed this question. An exception is Bester (1993), but he only allows for two levels of quality
(while makes the frims' choice of quality endogenous).
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2 The model
We consider a market for a single commodity of heterogeneous quality, composed of
a set of producers (sellers) and a set of consumers (buyers). 5 Both sets of agents are
assumed to be a continuum and their measure is normalized to one. Correspondingly,
each seller can be uniquely indexed by a type, µ 2 [0; 1]. Seller µ can produce the good
of quality q(µ), where q(:) : [0;1] 7! [0;1] is { without loss of generality { assumed
to be non-decreasing. For simplicity, we also assume that q(:) is continuous and we
normalize 6 q(1) at 1.
Each producer can sell a single unit in each period. The cost of production is
independent of the quality7 and, for simplicity, it is normalized to zero. The buyers
are all identical. Each of them wishes to purchase a single unit of the good. Their
valuation of a good of quality q(µ) is equal to the quality measure.
The market opens at t = 0 and it operates over time. The agents maximize their
expected utility, which they discount by the common discount factor, ± 2 (0; 1); per
unit of time. Players only receive utility if they consummate a transaction. The
utility of a consumer who purchases the product of seller µ for a price of p(µ) at time
t is given by [q(µ)¡ p(µ)] ±t, while seller µ's utility gain from the same transaction is
5While our principal application is professional services, we will stick to the standard terminology
of producers and consumers (of goods).
6Since we are not concerned with costs (they are sunk), if the highest quality produced were not
1, we could just shift up the quality distribution, without any real consequence.
7Since our main point is that mediocre quality is produced in equilibrium, by not giving mediocre
producers a cost advantage, we actually strengthen our result.
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p(µ) ±t.
The consumers only know the distribution of quality in the market. The game
starts by the buyers' search for producers. Each buyer chooses a seller at random
and learns the quality of her product upon entering the store. Search is costly. The
expected delay cost of ¯nding an empty store is represented by a discount of ±b. As
we will see, the value of this friction is endogenously determined, since it depends on
the ratio of active sellers to buyers. Once a consumer ¯nds himself in a store he starts
bargaining over the price with the seller.
The bargaining procedure is an enriched version of the standard model of alter-
nating o®ers. The added feature is that after a rejection, both players are allowed
to unilaterally terminate negotiations and return to the market. More speci¯cally,
bargaining between matched sellers and buyers proceeds as follows. First, one of the
parties is randomly selected to make the ¯rst proposal. The probability that the
buyer (the seller) is selected is ¸ (1¡ ¸). If the responder accepts the proposed price
the transaction is consummated, the agents collect their payo®s, the seller returns8
to the market and the buyer is replaced by a new, but unmatched, buyer. On the
other hand, if the responder rejects then either of the two bargainers has the option
to break up negotiations. In case of a break-up, it \costs" ±b and ±s for the buyer and
the seller, respectively, to ¯nd a new match. If neither player opts out, the responder
makes a counter-proposal after a delay of one time unit. The seller and the buyer al-
8We assume that the sellers are myopic, in the sense that they do not consider their future °ow
of income when negotiating with a buyer. Equivalently, they could be replaced by a new seller of
the same quality.
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ternate in making proposals until either a proposal is accepted or one of them breaks
up negotiations. If they continue to bargain forever, they both earn 0.
Note that our market is stationary, since both the measure and the type distribu-
tion of the agents are unaltered over time. Thus, in equilibrium, the expected gain of
a consumer upon entering the market, v, is constant. Since this value is also the con-
tinuation value of a buyer upon leaving a store empty-handed, when it is larger than
the minimum quality produced, there are producers who are unable to sell in equilib-
rium. We denote the marginal producer by µ¤ and we assume that in equilibrium all
producers with lower quality are absent from the market.9 Thus, an equilibrium of
this market can be described by µ¤ and the expected price10 at each producing seller's
store: p(µ) for µ ¸ µ¤.
Let us return to the search frictions. To capture the dependence of these on µ¤,
we assume that for each buyer the probability of a match with a seller is 1 ¡ µ¤ {
the number of sellers per buyer { in each period11 of (memoryless) matching. Let
us denote the (common) discount factor corresponding to one matching period by
±¢: The e®ective discount factors of a seller and a buyer are then determined by the
9Alternatively, we could assume that the non-trading sellers are still hanging around and thus it
is possible to be matched to them. The resulting search frictions would be identical (as long as the
buyers remain the long side of the market).
10As we will see, in equilibrium every match ends with immediate agreement.
11Think of a matching period as the time it takes for a seller (on the short side of the market) to
¯nd a buyer.
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following equations12
±s = ±
¢ and ±b = ±
¢ (1¡ µ¤ + µ¤±b) : (1)
Resolving the equations, we obtain
±s = ±
¢ and ±b =
±¢(1¡ µ¤)
1¡ ±¢µ¤ : (2)
3 The bargaining solution
We start our analysis by considering the negotiation between a buyer-seller pair in
isolation. To this e®ect, in this section, we assume that the outside options are ex-
ogenously given. Let xs and xb denote the seller's and the buyer's outside option
respectively. First, we characterize the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the sub-
games where one of the parties has already been chosen to be the ¯rst proposer. Let
us denote the equilibrium price of the subgame where the buyer (the seller) is the
¯rst proposer by p¤b(µ) (p
¤
s(µ)).
Proposition 1 i) If xs+ xb > q(µ), then the unique equilibrium outcome is an in-
stant break-up of negotiations in both subgames.
ii) Otherwise, immediate agreement at the prices p¤b(µ) = xs and p
¤
s(µ) = q(µ)¡ xb
can be supported by subgame-perfect equilibria independently of the values of the
outside options and of the players' time preferences.
12For readers more familiar with the continuous time formulation (Bellman equations), we provide
the equivalent treatment in the Appendix.
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iii) Finally, if xi  ±(± q(µ) ¡ x¡i) for i = s; b, then there exist a continuum of
equilibrium outcomes. First, immediate agreements at p¤b(µ) 2 [xs; ± q(µ)¡ xb]
and p¤s(µ) 2 [q(µ)(1¡ ±) + xs; q(µ)¡ xb], respectively. In addition, there exist
delayed agreements at a subset of these same prices.
Proof: It is a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 1 and the Theorem of Pon-
sat¶³ and S¶akovics (1998) to the present model. ²
When the aggregate value of the outside options exceeds the gains from trade, it is
evident that at least one of the traders will prefer not to trade. There is one equilib-
rium which always exists, whenever it is socially optimal to trade. This equilibrium,
henceforth the equilibrium in ultimatum strategies, is sustained by a credible threat of
the proposer to leave the bargaining table in case his o®er is rejected. The credibility
of this threat comes from the similar threat that the current responder makes in the
following period when she will be the proposer. To see this, imagine for a second
that the outside options are valueless. In this case, the equilibrium in ultimatum
strategies would give the entire surplus to the ¯rst proposer. Note that the threats
are sustaining each other: given that the proposer expects no gains tomorrow, his
threat of leaving today is credible. When the outside options are of positive value,
this argument is modi¯ed to the extent that the responder will have to be given at
least her outside option to be willing to trade.13
13Note that a positive outside option for the ¯rst proposer does not a®ect the argument, since his
payo® upon quitting rises together { in fact, even faster, because of discounting { with his expected
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As in any version of strategic bargaining models, in equilibrium the responder
has to be indi®erent between accepting or not, since otherwise the proposer could
increase his share. In the equilibrium in ultimatum strategies, this indi®erence is
between accepting and opting out. This leaves open another possibility to construct
equilibria: one where the responder is indi®erent between accepting and continuing to
the next period (and prefers both to opting out, of course). Since both of these values
are determined endogenously, it is not surprising that there is a continuum of ways
that this indi®erence can be achieved. Note also, that for this type of equilibrium to
exist, we also need that the proposer be willing to continue in case his o®er is rejected.
Finally, as it is standard in bargaining games which have multiple e±cient equilibria,
a threat to switch to an extreme equilibrium can support delayed agreements at some
intermediate prices.
The equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is salient, because it has a number of
attractive features.
i) As it is apparent from the statement of the result, this is the only equilibrium
which always exists when there are gains from trade.
ii) By the same token, when the outside options are su±ciently large compared to
the discount factor (if max(xs
±
+ xb
±2
; xs
±2
+ xb
±
) > q(µ)) this equilibrium is unique.
iii) Also, this is the only equilibrium in which strategies are independent of the
players' time preference.14 As a consequence, our equilibrium is valid even
payo® if he continues to bargain.
14This result generalizes to the case when the players have di®erent discount factors.
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when the players are uncertain about each others' discount factor.
iv) Finally, it is easy to see that this equilibrium outcome is the unique equilibrium
outcome for any ¯nite horizon truncation of the bargaining game. As a con-
sequence, our equilibrium is valid (and unique) even when there is a deadline,
before which agreement must be reached.
In view of the remarkable robustness of the equilibrium in ultimatum strategies, we
propose that it be considered as the \predicted behavior" in the bargaining problem.
That is, we assume that
Assumption A. 1 The negotiation between a buyer and seller µ results in immediate
agreement, with the expected price given by
p(µ) = ¸ xs + (1¡ ¸) (q(µ)¡ xb); (3)
whenever there exist gains from trade (xs+ xb  q(µ)).
It is remarkable that this bargaining solution coincides with the asymmetric Nash
solution (see, Hars¶anyi and Selten (1972)), where the outside options are interpreted
as the disagreement outcome, while ¸ and 1 ¡ ¸ are the bargaining weights of the
seller and the buyer, respectively.
Some readers may doubt the attractiveness of this feature in a model with impatient players. Note,
however, that in the full model of the decentralized market the e®ects of the players' impatience
while searching does ¯lter in through the (endogenous) outside options.
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4 The market equilibrium
In order to characterize our market equilibrium we need to do two things (simul-
taneously). Adapt the bargaining solution de¯ned in the preceding section to the
endogenous outside options of our search market and determine the marginal quality
produced.
Except for the cost of waiting, a seller's outside option does not vary from her
current expected value, which is given by the expected price:
xs(µ) = ±s p(µ) (4)
From (3) and (4) we obtain
xs(µ) =
(1¡ ¸)±s
1¡ ¸±s ¢ (q(µ)¡ xb) : (5)
Since the coe±cient is less than unity, (5) implies that the necessary and su±cient
condition for the existence of gains from trade { and, therefore, trade { is q(µ) ¸ xb.
Of course, the buyers' outside option depends on the distribution of quality o®ered.
Consequently, the lowest quality producer, µ¤, is de¯ned by q(µ¤) = xb(µ¤) { or by
zero when q(0) ¸ xb(0). 15
In order to determine the marginal quality, we need to calculate the buyers' outside
option. This is equal to the discounted expected pro¯ts from a future match. Note
15This de¯nition applies for any marginal producer satisfying the (in)equality, since { once µ¤tis
¯xed { the outside option is constant, while the quality produced is increasing in µ: Consequently,
potentially there could be multiple solutions.
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that, since the matching technology is memoryless, this expected value is independent
of the quality of the good they are currently bargaining for. Instead, it is a function
of the distribution of quality produced. Namely,
xb =
±b
1¡ µ¤ ¢
1Z
µ¤
[q(µ)¡ p(µ)] dµ (6)
Using (4), (5) and (6), we obtain
xb =
¸±b(1 ¡ ±s)
1¡ ¸±s ¡ ±b(1¡ ¸) ¢ AQ(µ
¤) =
¸±¢
1 ¡ ¸±¢µ¤
1Z
µ¤
q(µ) dµ; (7)
where AQ(µ¤) =
R 1
µ¤
q(µ)
1¡µ¤dµ denotes the average quality produced in equilibrium.
Theorem 2 If and only if
q(0) ¸ ¸±¢
1Z
0
q(µ) dµ; (8)
all the sellers will produce. In this case the equilibrium prices are given by
p(µ) =
1 ¡ ¸
1 ¡ ¸±¢ ¢
0@q(µ)¡ ¸±¢ 1Z
0
q(µ) dµ
1A : (9)
When (8) is not satis¯ed, the marginal seller is uniquely determined by the solution
to R 1
µ q(x) dx
q(µ)
=
1
¸±¢
¡ µ; (10)
while the corresponding prices are given by
p(µ) =
1 ¡ ¸
1 ¡ ¸±¢ ¢ [q(µ)¡ q(µ
¤)] :
Proof: By the above argument, we will have µ¤ = 0, when q(0) ¸ xb; or (8). In
this case, all the sellers will produce and the equilibrium price function follows from
(4), (5) and (7) evaluated at µ¤ = 0:
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If (8) is not satis¯ed, then xb = q(µ¤): Substituting into equation (7) and simpli-
fying we obtain the equilibrium condition
H (µ¤) =
1
¸±¢
¡ µ¤; (11)
where H (µ) =
R 1
µ
q(x)dx
q(µ)
. Observe that, in the interval [0;1],H (µ) is continuous and it
is monotonically decreasing, from
R 1
0
q(x) dx
q(0)
¸ 1 to 0. In addition, H 0 (1) = ¡1. On the
other hand, the RHS of (11) is larger than H(0) at µ = 0 { by the fact that (8) is not
satis¯ed {, but it is positive (and therefore larger than H(1)) at µ = 1. Consequently,
there always exists an interior solution. Thus, the existence of a market equilibrium
is guaranteed.
To see uniqueness (for both cases), just note that the slope of H(µ) is ¡1¡ q0
q
H(µ);
which is strictly less than ¡1, for µ < 1: ²
insert Figure1
Corollary 3 In equilibrium in every match there are always strictly positive gains to
trade:q(µ¤) > 0.
Proof: When q(0) > 0, the result is obvious. Otherwise, H(µ) = 1; for all µ
such that q(µ) = 0; so q(µ¤) must be positive. ²
The fact that the minimum quality provided is strictly above the buyers' threshold
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level has an important e®ect on the equilibrium \price-quality ratio". Note that
p(µ)
q(µ)
=
1¡ ¸
1¡ ¸±¢ ¢
2666641¡
max
(
q(µ¤); ¸±¢
1R
0
q(µ) dµ
)
q(µ)
377775 ; (12)
which is strictly increasing in q(µ). That is, the proportion of the gains from trade
appropriated by the sellers is increasing with the quality of their good. In other words,
the mark-up is increasing with the quality, a commonly observed fact of everyday life.
We can now determine how the marginal level of quality produced varies as the
common search frictions change. Note that the LHS of (10) is independent of ±¢,
while the RHS is (uniformly) decreasing in it . Consequently, µ¤ is increasing in
±¢. That is, we con¯rm that even in the case when the sellers (as well as the
buyers) can terminate negotiations, increasing the common search frictions decreases
the average quality sold in the market. On the other hand, in the limit as search
frictions disappear,16 we have
R 1
µ¤ q(x)dx
q(µ¤)
=
1
¸
¡ µ¤; (13)
which yields µ¤ < 1;whenever ¸ < 1:Thus, we have shown that
Corollary 4 In the (asymptotically) frictionless market, a signi¯cant range of quali-
ties is provided. The level of quality dispersion is increasing in the sellers' bargaining
power.
16In fact, given that the application we have in mind is in the service sector, it is plausible that
the provision of the (private) service takes time. That is, even as search frictions disappear, there is
still inherent delay in the market. It would be easy to model this explictly but there is no point in
doing it, since it would only bias the marginal quality (close to the limit) further downward.
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This is the main result of this analysis. Note that the level of quality dispersion is
signi¯cant. For example, under the assumption that quality is uniformly distributed
between zero and one, it is easy to show that
µ¤ =
1¡ p1¡ ¸2
¸
:
As we can see in Figure 2 below - plotting µ¤ as a function of ¸ - unless the buyers
have almost all the bargaining power, the quality dispersion in the market will be
very signi¯cant.
insert F igure 2
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided non-cooperative foundations for the (generalized)
Nash Bargaining Solution, which are speci¯cally applicable to market models of de-
centralized negotiation. The strategic form that we propose for the process of bilateral
bargaining witnesses the large amount of °exibility the parties have while negotiat-
ing. In particular, we assume that each party can voluntarily and credibly leave the
negotiation (for good) following the rejection of any o®er.
When we incorporate the Nash Bargaining Solution into a decentralized market
with asymmetric information about quality, we obtain that { in equilibrium { the
share of the gains from trade that accrues to the sellers is increasing with the quality
of the sellers' product. This result does not obtain using the alternative strategic
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bargaining models, whose solutions are not directly related to the outside options.
Additionally, we also overturn the result of Bester (1988), where he obtains that
as search frictions disappear only the highest quality seller will produce. The result
that in our model there is quality dispersion { even in the limit { is a consequence
of carefully modelling the sellers' option of refusing to sell to a given customer. In
particular, we have taken account of the fact that the search cost facing a buyer
is closely related to the number of sellers in the market. That is, as we decrease
the length of a matching period, the ratio of the buyers' to sellers' search costs is
increasing. Since the marginal quality is determined by the buyers' continuation
value this provides a force, which countervails the buyers' increased willingness to
wait for a better match, which balances out at an intermediate quality level.
The question that begs to be asked is how e±cient the equilibrium provision of
quality is. There is not a straightforward answer to this question, for two reasons.
First, it is unclear what should the benchmark be. A naive view could say that we
should maximize the amount of surplus generated per period, so the optimal solution
is for all sellers to produce. However, this solution does not take into account that a
buyer may prefer to wait rather than trade with a low quality seller. Second, since
by varying the bargaining weights the value of the marginal quality spans the entire
range, no matter what the benchmark is, by adjusting the relative bargaining power
we can always match the outcome. Thus, unless we want to calibrate the model
and thus hypothesize a true distribution of bargaining power, a welfare analysis is of
limited interest.
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Appendix
Here we provide the derivation of the buyers' Bellman equation, for the equivalent
speci¯cation in continuous time. Denote by V and H a buyer's continuation value
when unmatched and matched, respectively. Denote the common interest rate by r
and the \arrival rate" of sellers by s: For this treatment is advantageous to assume
that this arrival rate is of any seller, and thus matches with seller index below µ¤are
unsuccessful. We then have (c.f. equation (1))
V = e¡r¢ (s¢(1¡ µ¤)H + (1¡ s¢(1 ¡ µ¤))V ) :
Solving for V; and approximating e¡r¢ by 1 ¡ r¢ (and ignoring terms including
¢2); we obtain (c.f. equation (2))
V = H
s(1¡ µ¤)
r + s(1¡ µ¤) :
If we take into account that V = q(µ¤) {as argued in the paper{ we can rewrite
the above as
rV = s(1¡ µ¤)(H ¡ q(µ¤));
which may look more familiar.
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